Voodoo versus fishing committees: the role of traditional and contemporary institutions in fisheries management by Briones Alonso, Elena et al.
RESEARCH OUTPUTS / RÉSULTATS DE RECHERCHE
Author(s) - Auteur(s) :
Publication date - Date de publication :
Permanent link - Permalien :
Rights / License - Licence de droit d’auteur :
Bibliothèque Universitaire Moretus Plantin
Institutional Repository - Research Portal
Dépôt Institutionnel - Portail de la Recherche
researchportal.unamur.be
Voodoo versus fishing committees: the role of traditional and contemporary
institutions in fisheries management
Briones Alonso, Elena; Houssa, Romain; Verpoorten, Marijke
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link t  publication
Citation for pulished version (HARVARD):
Briones Alonso, E, Houssa, R & Verpoorten, M 2015 'Voodoo versus fishing committees: the role of traditional
and contemporary institutions in fisheries management'.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. Jun. 2020
1 
 
Online Appendix to the Paper  
‘Voodoo versus fishing committees: the role of traditional and contemporary 
institutions in fisheries management’ 
 
 
Briones Alonso, Elenaa Houssa, Romainb Verpoorten, Marijkec  
a Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS), University of Leuven (KU Leuven). 
Waaistraat 6 bus 3511, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. Email: elena.brionesalonso@kuleuven.be. 
Corresponding author. 
b Centre of Research in the Economics of Development (CRED) and CeReFiM, University of Namur, 
Rue de Bruxelles 61, B-5000 Namur, Belgium. Email: romain.roussa@UNamur.be 
c Institute for Development Policy and Management (IOB), University of Antwerp (UA), Prinsstraat 13, 
B-2000 Antwerpen, Belgium; and Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS), 
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Appendix A reports summary statistics, full results and a detailed discussion of the 
robustness checks. Appendix B provides additional information on data collection. We explain 
the implementation of the 2009 household survey in detail, discuss variable measurement and 
present the questions asked in the household survey and fishery census. Appendix C provides a 
more detailed description of the history of Voodoo and fisheries management, which was 
summarized in the introduction of the paper. 
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A. Summary statistics and full results 
A.1. Summary statistics 
Table A.1: Summary statistics of individual and household characteristics  
Panel A: Household survey sample (2009) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Max. N 
Age 44.25 13.73 90 97 
Years of education 0.67 2.02 12 103 
Annual income 1,810,613 1,446,688 7,850,000 102 
Annual income from fishery sector 1,557,422 1,341,902 7,850,000 102 
Household size 6.76 4.09 22 95 
Dependency ratio 0.83 0.75 4 90 
Number of fishing days 4.37 2.15 7 1,442 
Number of persons fishing 1.73 0.73 8 1,201 
Panel B: Fishery census sample (2006) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Max. N 
Age 37 13.06 80 5,803 
Number of dependent children 4.7 2.80 15 5,187 
Share with formal education 16.5     5,852 
Share Goun ethnicity 2.0     5,852 
Share Aizo ethnicity 4.0     5,852 
Share Tofin ethnicity 83.3     5,852 
Share Xwla ethnicity 9.6     5,852 
Share Wémè ethnicity 0.2 
  
5,852 
Share Sèto ethnicity 0.7 
  
5,852 
Share Adja ethnicity 0.2 
  
5,852 
Share Sahouè ethnicity 0.2 
  
5,852 
Source: Author’s calculations. Notes: Earnings are expressed in CFA. One euro equaled about 656 CFA in 2009. 
The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of dependent members (dependent children and seniors of 60 years and 
older) over active members of the household.  
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A.2 Full tables for main results 
 
Table A.2: OLS estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Voodoo -0.151** -0.157*** -0.245*** -0.233** -0.232** -0.260*** -0.259*** -0.252*** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.086) (0.096) (0.096) (0.085) (0.092) (0.090) 
Week 
 
0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
(log) Age 
   
-0.131 -0.132 -0.142* -0.159 -0.161 
 
   
(0.091) (0.091) (0.084) (0.098) (0.098) 
(log) Years of education 
    
-0.006 -0.011 -0.026 -0.023 
 
    
(0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) 
(log) Annual income 
     
0.153*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 
 
     
(0.049) (0.054) (0.053) 
Household size 
      
0.015 0.016 
 
      
(0.011) (0.012) 
Dependency ratio 
       
-0.028 
 
       
(0.053) 
Arrondissement No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.268*** 0.160*** 0.272*** 0.750** 0.758** -1.445* -1.442* -1.406 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.076) (0.352) (0.354) (0.799) (0.849) (0.849) 
         
Number of clusters 102 102 102 97 97 97 89 88 
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,053 1,039 
R-squared 0.025 0.041 0.059 0.066 0.066 0.110 0.121 0.125 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Annual income is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 656 CFA in 2009. Week refers to a count variable that indicates the survey week. 
Arrondissement refers to dummy variables indicating the arrondissement in which the individual lives.  
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Table A.3: OLS estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2006 fishery census) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou by fisher i 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Voodoo -0.146*** -0.067** -0.067** -0.069* -0.066* 
 (0.050) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) 
(log) Age  -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.200*** -0.197*** 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.050) 
Level of education   -0.004 0.000 0.004 
   (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Number of children    0.004 0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Ethnicity No No No No Yes 
      
Village No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Constant 0.342*** 0.687*** 0.696*** 0.787*** 0.809*** 
 (0.046) (0.153) (0.153) (0.181) (0.183) 
      
Number of clusters 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 5,852 5,824 5,824 5,162 5,162 
R-squared 0.018 0.261 0.261 0.263 0.267 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Village refers to dummy variables indicating the village in which the individual lives. Ethnicity refers to ethnicity dummies indicating to which 
ethnicity the fisherman belongs. 
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Table A.4 : Individual fixed effects estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks 
(2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
     
Closed -0.109*** -0.090*** -0.095*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) 
Week  0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Voodoo*Closed  0.035 
 
  (0.059) 
Constant 0.509*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 
 
(0.009) (0.072) (0.072) 
    
Number of clusters 47 47 47 
Observations 577 577 577 
Within R-squared 0.014 0.079 0.079 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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A.3. Detailed exposition of robustness checks 
A.3.1. Alternative sample 
Our baseline analysis of the 2009 household survey data relied on a balanced sample of fishers, 
i.e. fishers who were visited in all 14 weeks. This choice was motivated by the fact that the 
timing of missing weeks may be related to the use of the konou and the fishing committee rule. 
For instance, fishers who were violating the fishing committee rule by using the konou in closed 
weeks may have avoided to be interviewed in those weeks. It is also possible that fishers who 
generally comply to the fishing committee rule take up alternative economic activities in closed 
weeks to compensate for the inability to use the konou.  
 We verify whether our results hold when we re-estimate Eq.(1), (3) and (4) using an 
unbalanced sample of fishers, including fishers who were not interviewed in one or more weeks.1 
The unbalanced sample includes 121 fishers. We extend Eq.(1) with the regressor Missing weeksi 
which counts the number of weeks in which the fisher was not interviewed. The OLS estimation 
results for Eq.(1) are reported in Table A.5; the individual fixed effects estimation results for 
Eq.(3) and Eq.(4) are reported in Table A.6. The results are qualitatively the same and 
quantitatively similar to our baseline results. 
A.3.2. Alternative estimation model 
We check whether we obtain the same results using nonlinear estimations models. We start by 
re-estimating Eq.(1)-(4) using a probit model. The results are presented in Tables A.7-A.10  and 
are highly similar to the results obtained using linear estimation models. In contrast to the 
individual fixed effects model used for the baseline estimation of Eq.(4), the probit model allows 
us to estimate the coefficient for Voodoo adherence (a time-invariant variable). Table A.10 
1 As there is no time dimension in the census data, this test is not relevant for Eq.(2). 
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presents the probit estimation results for Eq.(4). The marginal effect for Voodoo adherence has a 
negative sign but is not statistically significantly different from zero. This finding might at first 
appear to contradict our earlier results regarding the relation between Voodoo adherence and the 
use of the konou (Table A.2). However, these earlier results applied for the full sample of fishers, 
which includes konou users and fishers who do not use the konou at all. In contrast, the results 
presented in Table A.10 hold only for the subsample of konou users. Among these konou users 
are Voodoo fishers who have decided to break the traditional rule. Hence, the insignificant result 
for Voodoo adherence in Table A.10 indicates that Voodoo fishers, once they have decided to 
break the traditional rule, are on average equally likely to use the konou in any given week as 
other konou users (all else equal). 
We further re-estimate Eq.(3) and (4) using a probit individual fixed effects model (by 
adding 47 individual dummy variables as regressors).2 The results for Eq.(3) and (4), presented 
in Table A.11, are again quantitatively similar to the main results for Eq.(3) and (4) (cfr. Table 
A.4). 
A.3.3. Alternative dependent variable 
We verify whether our results for Eq.(1) hold when we use an alternative definition of 
compliance to the traditional rule. So far we have used a time-varying dependent variable, i.e. the 
use of the konou across weeks. This choice is motivated by the fact that the decision to use the 
konou depends in part on unobserved time-varying variables such as the growth cycle of shrimp 
or local conditions on the lake (e.g. salinity of the water). Looking at the variation in the use of 
2 As explained before, we do not apply this robustness check to Eq.(1) and (2) since our variable of interest is time-
invariant. 
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the konou across weeks allows us to control for these unobserved weekly-varying variables and 
produce a more precise coefficient estimate for Voodoo adherence. 
Nevertheless, since our regressor of interest – Voodoo adherence – does not vary over 
time, we can construct a time-invariant measure of overall compliance to the traditional rule. 
More specifically, we take the simple sum of the number of weeks the konou was used by 
fisherman i across the observation period of 14 weeks. In Eq.(1), we replace the binary 
dependent variable use of the konou in week t by the aggregated variable total use of the konou 
by individual i. We estimate this adjusted equation using OLS. We use heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors rather than clustered standard errors, as we no longer exploit the time dimension 
of the data and serial correlation of the error terms is not a concern.  
The results are reported in Table A.12 and indicate that a Voodoo fisherman on average 
uses the konou 2.9 weeks less than a fisherman who follows another religion (all else equal). 
Sample fishermen who are not Voodoo adherents used the konou on average in 3.2 weeks (with 
a standard deviation of 3.6 weeks) in total. Hence, the average estimated impact of Voodoo 
adherence on total konou use amounts to 90 % of the sample average of total konou use among 
non-Voodoo fishers.
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Table A.5: OLS estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence – unbalanced sample (2009 household survey ) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          Voodoo -0.103* -0.109* -0.165** -0.154** -0.154** -0.166** -0.162** -0.160** -0.173** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.071) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) Week 
 
0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
(log) Age 
   
-0.109 -0.106 -0.123 -0.139 -0.140 -0.119 
    
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) 
(log) Years of Education 
    
0.015 0.011 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
     
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) 
(log) Annual income 
     
0.048** 0.045** 0.045** 0.064** 
      
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) 
Household size 
      
0.012 0.013 0.011 
       
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Dependency ratio 
       
-0.010 -0.004 
        
(0.046) (0.044) 
Missing weeks 
        
0.032** 
         
(0.014) 
Arrondissement No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Constant 0.282*** 0.187*** 0.260*** 0.654** 0.639** 0.009 0.033 0.034 -0.335 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.063) (0.297) (0.297) (0.376) (0.371) (0.371) (0.433) 
          Number of clusters 158 158 158 152 152 148 137 136 136 
Observations 1,555 1,555 1,555 1,485 1,485 1,465 1,374 1,360 1,360 
R-squared 0.011 0.023 0.030 0.035 0.035 0.051 0.060 0.061 0.076 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. The regressor Missing weeks counts the number of weeks for which information is missing for individual i. For more details on the explanatory 
variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2.  
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Table A.6: Individual fixed effects estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks - unbalanced 
sample  
(2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
Closed -0.133*** -0.115*** -0.107*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) 
Week  0.023*** 0.023*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Voodoo*Closed  -0.041 
 
  (0.071) 
Constant 0.541*** 0.341*** 0.341*** 
 
(0.009) (0.064) (0.064) 
    
Number of clusters 76 76 76 
Observations 789 789 789 
Within R-squared 0.020 0.062 0.063 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the 
notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.7: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t             
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8)  
Marginal 
effects 
          
Voodoo -0.571** -0.847** -0.780** -0.778** -0.925*** -0.878*** -0.851*** -0.216*** 
 (0.262) (0.331) (0.345) (0.346) (0.327) (0.332) (0.326) (0.064) 
Week  0.045*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.017*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) 
(log) Age   -0.463 -0.470 -0.525* -0.558* -0.558* -0.171* 
   (0.303) (0.305) (0.290) (0.326) (0.325) (0.101) 
(log) Years of education    -0.025 -0.042 -0.093 -0.085 -0.026 
    (0.161) (0.162) (0.173) (0.175) (0.053) 
(log) Annual income     0.528*** 0.495*** 0.494*** 0.151*** 
     (0.177) (0.179) (0.176) (0.053) 
Household size      0.046 0.051 0.016 
      (0.035) (0.036) (0.011) 
Dependency ratio       -0.091 -0.028 
       (0.188) (0.058) 
Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -0.618*** -0.678*** 1.014 1.046 -6.507** -6.208** -6.181**  
 (0.105) (0.228) (1.177) (1.185) (2.860) (2.891) (2.859)  
         
Number of clusters 102 102 97 97 97 89 88 88 
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,053 1,039 1,039 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (8) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (7). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A2. 
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Table A.8: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2006 fishery census) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou by fisher i 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  Marginal effects 
      
  Voodoo -0.450*** -0.381*** -0.254* -0.256* -0.255* -0.236* -0.067* 
 (0.156) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.143) (0.140) (0.037) 
(log) Age 
  
-0.631*** -0.633*** -0.730*** -0.730*** -0.217*** 
 
  
(0.155) (0.155) (0.187) (0.189) (0.055) 
Literacy 
   
-0.017 -0.003 0.016 0.005 
 
   
(0.044) (0.046) (0.058) (0.017) 
Number of children 
    
0.019 0.018 0.005 
 
    
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004) 
 
       
Village No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -0.408*** -2.088*** 0.104 0.135 0.606 0.742 
 
 (0.125) (0.036) (0.536) (0.541) (0.665) (0.776) 
 
        
Number of clusters 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 5,852 5,852 5,824 5,824 5,162 5,160 5,160 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (7) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (6). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.9: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks (2009 household survey – subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8)  
Marginal 
effects 
          
Closed -0.340*** -0.312*** -0.308*** -0.309*** -0.310*** -0.305*** -0.334*** -0.133*** 
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.085) (0.034) 
Week  0.069*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.032*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) 
(log) Age   -0.377 -0.384 -0.388 -0.692** -0.693** -0.277** 
   (0.340) (0.347) (0.342) (0.294) (0.296) (0.118) 
(log) Years of education    -0.030 -0.032 0.022 0.022 0.009 
    (0.196) (0.197) (0.160) (0.155) (0.062) 
(log) Annual income     -0.027 0.131 0.132 0.053 
     (0.129) (0.143) (0.141) (0.056) 
Household size      0.100*** 0.101*** 0.040*** 
      (0.036) (0.036) (0.014) 
Dependency ratio       -0.006 -0.002 
       (0.167) (0.067) 
Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.042 -0.230 1.148 1.182 1.611 -0.603 -0.622  
 (0.101) (0.210) (1.332) (1.366) (2.091) (2.300) (2.324)  
         
Number of clusters 47 47 46 46 46 46 45 45 
Observations 577 577 563 563 563 563 549 549 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (8) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (7). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.10: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou by Voodoo fishers in closed weeks (2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8)  
Marginal 
effects 
          Voodoo -0.260 -0.514 -0.496 -0.495 -0.508 -0.401 -0.422 -0.168 
 (0.336) (0.372) (0.382) (0.383) (0.383) (0.292) (0.305) (0.121) Closed -0.332*** -0.305*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.311*** -0.348*** -0.139*** 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.038) Voodoo*Closed -0.089 -0.135 -0.131 -0.130 -0.132 -0.005 0.026 0.019 
 
(0.237) (0.279) (0.283) (0.284) (0.284) (0.208) (0.208) (0.073) 
Week  0.070*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.032*** 
  
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) 
(log) Age   -0.307 -0.309 -0.302 -0.595** -0.593** -0.236** 
   (0.319) (0.322) (0.316) (0.297) (0.300) (0.120) Literacy    -0.010 -0.007 0.034 0.037 0.015 
    (0.170) (0.171) (0.150) (0.147) (0.059) (log) Annual income     0.043 0.161 0.170 0.068 
     (0.118) (0.141) (0.138) (0.055) Household size      0.090** 0.092** 0.037** 
      (0.037) (0.036) (0.014) Dependency ratio       -0.039 -0.016 
       (0.170) (0.068) Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Constant 0.085 -0.049 1.064 1.076 0.407 -1.190 -1.322  
 (0.103) (0.201) (1.204) (1.217) (1.938) (2.256) (2.267)  
         
         Number of clusters 47 47 46 46 46 46 45 45 
Observations 577 577 563 563 563 563 549 549 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (8) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (7). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.11: Probit individual fixed effects estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks 
(2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  Marginal effects 
    
 Closed -0.352*** -0.308*** -0.311*** -0.122*** 
 (0.093) (0.095) (0.105) (0.041) 
Week 
 
0.092*** 0.092*** 0.036*** 
  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.012) 
Voodoo*Closed 
  
0.029 0.017 
   
(0.250) (0.074) 
Constant 0.678*** 0.050 0.051 
 
 
(0.030) (0.192) (0.194) 
 
    
 Number of clusters 43 43 43 43 
Observations 550 550 550 549 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively.  Column (4) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (3). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2.  
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Table A.12: OLS estimation results: Total use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable Total number of weeks fisherman i used the konou    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         Voodoo -1.874*** -2.749*** -2.529** -2.522** -2.809*** -3.002*** -2.884*** 
 (0.668) (0.991) (1.081) (1.089) (0.964) (1.083) (1.086) 
(log) Age 
  
-1.954* -1.980* -2.146** -1.908 -1.935 
 
  
(1.075) (1.089) (1.012) (1.212) (1.217) 
(log) Years of education 
   
-0.101 -0.211 -0.354 -0.311 
 
   
(0.540) (0.536) (0.566) (0.575) 
(log) Annual wage 
    
1.784*** 1.722** 1.694** 
 
    
(0.640) (0.738) (0.739) 
Household size 
     
0.090 0.113 
 
     
(0.136) (0.149) 
Dependency Ratio 
      
-0.443 
 
      
(0.598) 
Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
       Constant 3.160*** 4.238*** 11.552*** 11.675*** -13.614 -13.860 -13.230 
 
(0.416) (0.914) (4.209) (4.279) (10.235) (11.660) (11.723) 
 
       Observations 103 103 97 97 97 89 88 
R-squared 0.058 0.086 0.107 0.107 0.192 0.194 0.199 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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A.4. Full tables for analysis in section 6 (competing explanations) 
A.4.1. Unobserved individual heterogeneity 
 
Table A.13: OLS estimation results: Ownership of recent technologies and Voodoo adherence 
(2009 household survey - balanced sample) 
Dependent variable Individual owns mobile phone 
Household owns 
electricity generator 
Household 
owns radio 
Household owns 
television 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Voodoo -0.184 0.168 0.084 -0.006 
  (0.164) (0.133) (0.195) (0.084) 
(log) Age -0.115 -0.077 -0.327* -0.107 
  (0.197) (0.152) (0.167) (0.138) 
(log) Years of 
education -0.069 -0.081* -0.039 0.021 
  (0.086) (0.046) (0.083) (0.067) 
(log) Annual wage 0.134 -0.121* 0.016 -0.097* 
  (0.093) (0.063) (0.092) (0.058) 
Household size 0.016 0.032** -0.001 0.027* 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) 
Dependency Ratio 0.072 -0.076 0.044 -0.035 
  (0.093) (0.082) (0.083) (0.075) 
Arrondissement -0.192 -0.026 0.179 -0.020 
  (0.170) (0.129) (0.174) (0.102) 
Constant -0.883 2.018* 1.532 1.744 
  (1.517) (1.153) (1.482) (1.067) 
          
Observations 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.135 0.123 0.073 0.119 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Controls are discussed in section 4.1. of the paper. 
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Table A.14: OLS estimation results: Ownership of new technologies and Voodoo adherence 
(2009 household survey – unbalanced sample) 
Dependent variable Individual owns mobile phone 
Household owns 
electricity generator 
Household 
owns radio 
Household owns 
television 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Voodoo -0.076 -0.136 0.043 -0.191** 
  (0.100) (0.108) (0.123) (0.076) 
(log) Age -0.108 -0.074 -0.243** -0.116 
  (0.118) (0.108) (0.097) (0.099) 
(log) Years of 
education -0.054 -0.011 0.010 0.048 
  (0.069) (0.057) (0.061) (0.060) 
(log) Annual wage -0.002 0.016*** 0.051*** 0.013** 
  (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Household size 0.016* 0.024** 0.005 0.022** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Dependency Ratio 0.006 -0.046 -0.020 -0.015 
  (0.059) (0.069) (0.062) (0.064) 
Arrondissement -0.289*** -0.015 0.136 0.013 
  (0.096) (0.100) (0.115) (0.081) 
Constant 1.140** 0.176 0.807** 0.305 
  (0.495) (0.389) (0.383) (0.357) 
          
Observations 121 121 121 121 
R-squared 0.122 0.089 0.116 0.133 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Controls are discussed in section 4.1. of the paper. 
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Table A.15: OLS estimation results: Voodoo adherence and the use of the konou - inclusion of control variables (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Voodoo -0.151** -0.157*** -0.245*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.238** -0.233** -0.209* -0.201* -0.201* 
 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.086) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.098) (0.107) (0.116) (0.113) (0.114) 
           
(log) Age    -0.161 -0.217** -0.215** -0.215** -0.145 -0.145 -0.170 -0.170 
    (0.098) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.100) (0.097) (0.104) (0.104) (log) Years of education    -0.023 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.023 -0.028 -0.030 -0.030 
    (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (log) Annual income    0.149*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.140** 0.126** 0.131** 0.131** 
    (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) Household size    0.016 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.019 
    (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) Dependency ratio    -0.028 -0.048 -0.047 -0.054 -0.034 -0.047 -0.045 -0.046 
    (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) 
Relationship household head     -0.050** -0.052** -0.056*** -0.043* -0.045* -0.046* -0.046* 
    (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) Marital status      -0.027 -0.052 -0.019 -0.046 -0.061 -0.063 
      (0.123) (0.127) (0.146) (0.144) (0.150) (0.149) Number of wives       0.040 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.044 
       (0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058) (0.060) Mobile phone        0.107* 0.134* 0.132* 0.132* 
        (0.064) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077) Electricity generator         -0.086 -0.077 -0.074 
         (0.112) (0.114) (0.136) Radio          -0.074 -0.074 
          (0.066) (0.066) TV           -0.006 
           
(0.134) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondissement No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            Number of clusters 102 102 102 88 88 88 88 79 79 79 79 
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 927 927 927 927 
R-squared 0.025 0.041 0.059 0.125 0.138 0.138 0.141 0.160 0.164 0.169 0.169 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. For more details on the 
explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2 and section 6.1. of the paper. 
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A.4.2. Reporting bias regarding the use of the konou 
Full results for the estimation of Eq.(5) and Eq.(6) are presented in Tables A.16 and A.17 
respectively. 
To verify whether the fluctuations in shrimp fishing revenue across open and closed 
weeks are caused by a natural cyclicality in fishing activities rather than the fishing 
committee rule, we run a falsification test. We implement the test by comparing the 
fluctuations of fishing revenue at lake Nokoué with those of lake Ahémé, another coastal lake 
in southern Benin close to lake Nokoué (see Figure 1). At this lake the socio-ecological 
system and nature of fishing activities are similar to lake Nokoué. The key differences for our 
purpose are the absence of the fishing committee rule and the fact that the government 
prohibited the use of the konou at lake Ahémé (and this prohibition is well enforced).  
Our falsification test takes the form of a difference-in-differences analysis, which 
allows us to examine whether the fluctuations in shrimp fishing revenue at lake Nokoué are 
significantly larger than fluctuations in shrimp fishing revenue for the control, i.e. lake 
Ahémé. Finding no significant difference between the two lakes would suggest that the 
fluctuations observed at lake Nokoué are caused by a cyclicality of fishing activities rather 
than the fishing committee rule. 
 We augment equations (5) and (6) with interaction terms between the sets of closed 
and open week indicator variables, and an indicator variable that takes value 1 for lake 
Nokoué (and 0 for lake Ahémé).3 We estimate the augmented regression equations for an 
extended household survey sample by adding 14 weekly observations for 116 fishermen 
living in 6 villages at lake Ahémé. Table A.18 and A.19 presents the estimation results for 
closed and open weeks respectively. The coefficient estimates indicate that the drop in shrimp 
fishing revenue in the first closed weeks and the jump in shrimp fishing revenue in the first 
3 This indicator variable for lake Nokoué is absorbed by the individual fixed effects. 
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open weeks are significantly larger at lake Nokoué compared to lake Ahémé. We therefore 
reject the hypothesis that the fluctuations in fishing revenue observed at lake Nokoué are 
merely the result of natural cyclicality.  
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Table A.16: Individual fixed effects estimation results: Shrimp fishing revenue in closed weeks 
(2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Closed first week -1.186*** -1.184*** -0.914*** -0.909*** -0.783*** 
 
(0.277) (0.275) (0.238) (0.295) (0.253) 
Closed second week -0.505** -0.499** -0.325 -0.259 -0.094 
 
(0.233) (0.232) (0.210) (0.258) (0.221) 
Week 
 
0.011 -0.025 -0.064 -0.002 
  
(0.046) (0.043) (0.051) (0.044) 
(log) Fishing days 
  
2.274*** 2.413*** 1.589** 
   
(0.280) (0.812) (0.715) 
(log) Persons fishing 
   
1.169 1.563 
    
(1.032) (1.042) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
      Constant 3.485*** 3.393*** 0.161 -0.941 -1.008 
 
(0.083) (0.372) (0.517) (1.765) (1.724) 
      Number of clusters 103 103 103 102 102 
Observations 1,438 1,438 1,438 1,197 1,184 
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.122 0.027 0.255 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled 
about 656 CFA in 2009. Week is a count variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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Table A.17: Individual fixed effects estimation results: Shrimp fishing revenue in open weeks  
(2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t   
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Open first week 1.513*** 1.512*** 1.275*** 1.244*** 1.169*** 
 
(0.305) (0.303) (0.264) (0.312) (0.280) 
Open second week 1.179*** 1.174*** 1.004*** 0.995*** 0.670** 
 
(0.346) (0.339) (0.304) (0.357) (0.311) 
Open third week 0.990*** 0.986*** 0.687** 0.733** 0.375 
 
(0.347) (0.341) (0.301) (0.351) (0.319) 
Open fourth week 0.632** 0.631** 0.394* 0.328 0.228 
 
(0.245) (0.242) (0.222) (0.269) (0.243) 
Week 
 
0.003 -0.032 -0.069 -0.004 
  
(0.046) (0.043) (0.050) (0.044) 
(log) Fishing days 
  
2.278*** 2.373*** 1.558** 
   
(0.278) (0.808) (0.705) 
(log) Persons fishing 
   
1.184 1.568 
    
(1.039) (1.047) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
      Constant 2.487*** 2.462*** -0.547 -1.574 -1.483 
 
(0.168) (0.421) (0.569) (1.820) (1.774) 
      Number of clusters 103 103 103 102 102 
Observations 1,438 1,438 1,438 1,197 1,184 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.128 0.034 0.260 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 
656 CFA in 2009. Week is a count variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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Table A.18: Individual fixed effects estimation results 
Falsification test: Shrimp fishing revenue in closed weeks at two lakes (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Closed first week -0.233 -0.322* -0.245 -0.260* -0.272* 
 
(0.192) (0.192) (0.148) (0.153) (0.160) 
Closed second week 0.393*** 0.365*** 0.239** 0.193* 0.092 
 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.105) (0.103) (0.108) 
Closed first week*Nokoué -1.078*** -1.005*** -0.681** -0.767** -0.566* 
 
(0.349) (0.351) (0.290) (0.347) (0.318) 
Closed second week*Nokoué -0.911*** -0.918*** -0.541** -0.471 -0.186 
 
(0.284) (0.285) (0.250) (0.305) (0.271) 
Week  -0.087*** -0.105*** -0.119*** -0.070** 
 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) 
(log) Fishing days   3.201*** 3.253*** 2.539*** 
 
  (0.194) (0.603) (0.567) 
(log) Persons fishing    2.493*** 2.671*** 
 
   (0.568) (0.570) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
 
     
Constant 5.516*** 6.235*** 1.053*** -1.045 -1.414 
 
(0.049) (0.254) (0.384) (1.218) (1.139) 
      Number of clusters 219 219 219 218 218 
Observations 2,939 2,939 2,939 2,576 2,532 
R-squared 0.013 0.023 0.221 0.073 0.213 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 
656 CFA in 2009. The baseline category for the indicator variable lake Nokoué is lake Ahémé. Week is a count 
variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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Table A.19: Individual fixed effects estimation results 
Falsification test: Shrimp fishing revenue in open weeks at two lakes (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Open first week 0.353* 0.442** 0.298* 0.292* 0.321* 
 
(0.189) (0.188) (0.160) (0.176) (0.188) 
Open second week 0.122 0.298 0.210 0.254 0.340* 
 
(0.203) (0.203) (0.170) (0.180) (0.189) 
Open third week -0.309 -0.155 -0.067 0.011 0.186 
 
(0.256) (0.260) (0.206) (0.211) (0.215) 
Open fourth week -0.577*** -0.504*** -0.293* -0.231 -0.141 
 
(0.187) (0.186) (0.152) (0.155) (0.156) 
Open first week*Nokoué 1.390*** 1.333*** 1.119*** 1.211*** 1.084*** 
 
(0.371) (0.371) (0.316) (0.375) (0.356) 
Open second week*Nokoué 1.222*** 1.166*** 0.973*** 0.977** 0.550 
 
(0.426) (0.428) (0.374) (0.437) (0.400) 
Open third week*Nokoué 1.358*** 1.305*** 0.762* 0.797* 0.174 
 
(0.459) (0.461) (0.391) (0.449) (0.432) 
Open fourth week*Nokoué 1.184*** 1.135*** 0.579** 0.505 0.276 
 
(0.324) (0.327) (0.291) (0.342) (0.313) 
Week  -0.092*** -0.109*** -0.122*** -0.072** 
 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) 
(log) Fishing days   3.192*** 3.209*** 2.485*** 
 
  (0.191) (0.602) (0.563) 
(log) Persons fishing    2.527*** 2.716*** 
 
   (0.560) (0.558) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
 
     
Constant 5.103*** 5.784*** 0.750* -1.342 -1.666 
 
(0.100) (0.266) (0.390) (1.214) (1.130) 
      Number of clusters 219 219 219 218 218 
Observations 2,939 2,939 2,939 2,576 2,532 
R-squared 0.019 0.031 0.227 0.079 0.219 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 
656 CFA in 2009.  The baseline category for the indicator variable lake Nokoué is lake Ahémé. Week is a count 
variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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B. Additional information on data collection 
B.1. Details on the implementation of the 2009 household survey  
For the household survey, households were visited each two weeks during the survey period. 
During every visit, two modules were administered: the bi-weekly module and a one-time 
module. One-time modules were implemented during one visit only, and each module focused 
on a different theme (e.g. individual characteristics of household members, household assets, 
schooling and health). Bi-weekly modules were implemented each bi-weekly visit and collected 
information for the past two weeks (separately for each week) on revenues, expenditures and 
activities of fishers and fishmongers.  
As it was not possible to visit all households simultaneously in one week, households 
were divided into two groups. These groups were alternately visited during the survey period. In 
other words, each week one of the two groups was visited to collect bi-weekly information. This 
procedure implies that the first visit to one group of households took place one week earlier than 
the first visit to the second group of households. Similarly, the last visit to the second group of 
households took place one week after the last visit to the first group. Hence, although each 
household was visited bi-weekly during 14 weeks, the total time span of the survey was 15 
weeks. Table B.1 illustrates this procedure in detail. 
Because of this implementation, in the first week we only have information on fishing 
activities for the first group of households; in the last week we only have information on fishing 
activities for the second group of households.  
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Table B.1: Illustration of the implementation of the bi-weekly module in the 2009 household survey 
Dates Week Household group visited 
Visit 
number for 
group 1 
Visit 
number for 
group 2 
Information gathered for 
group 1 
Information gathered for 
group 2 
April 13 - 19 1       visit 1: previous week none 
April 20 - 26 2 1 visit 1   visit 1: current week visit 1: previous week 
April 27 - May 3 3 2   visit 1 visit 2: previous week visit 1: current week 
May 4 - 10 4 1 visit 2   visit 2: current week visit 2: previous week 
May 11 - 17 5 2   visit 2 visit 3: previous week visit 2: current week 
May 18 - 24 6 1 visit 3   visit 3: current week visit 3: previous week 
May 25 - 31 7 2   visit 3 visit 4: previous week visit 3: current week 
June 1 - 7 8 1 visit 4   visit 4: current week visit 4: previous week 
June 8 - 14 9 2   visit 4 visit 5: previous week visit 4: current week 
June 15 - 21 10 1 visit 5   visit 5: current week visit 5: previous week 
June 22 - 28 11 2   visit 5 visit 6: previous week visit 5: current week 
June 29 - July 5 12 1 visit 6   visit 6: current week visit 6: previous week 
July 6 - 12 13 2   visit 6 visit 7: previous week visit 6: current week 
July 13 - 19 14 1 visit 7   visit 7: current week visit 7: previous week 
July 20 - 26 15 2   visit 7 none visit 7: current week 
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Our results are basically unchanged when we exclude the observations in the first and last 
week (i.e. weeks 1 and 15), with some minor changes in coefficient sizes for the variables of 
interest (results not reported, but available on request). We have therefore chosen to include the 
first and last weeks in our empirical analysis in order to take full advantage of the information 
available in the survey.  
B.2. Details on variable measurement and questions asked  
For both the 2009 household survey and the 2006 fishery census we provide a detailed 
exposition of how variables were measured and which questions were asked to obtain the 
necessary information. 
Information on religious adherence was obtained in the one-time module on household 
member characteristics by asking the following question: “What is the main religious confession 
of this person?”. 4  The answer coding included a separate code for Voodoo or animism 
(animiste). Weekly information on the use of the konou was obtained in the fishing activity 
questionnaire of the bi-weekly module. The administrator asked the following question: “What 
fishing instruments have you used in the past two weeks?”5 and consequently read out loud a list 
of fishing instruments used at lake Nokoué. For each fishing instrument, the respondent indicated 
whether he had used it in the past week and the week before, up to a maximum of three 
instruments. If more than three  fishing instruments had been used, the interviewer recorded the 
three most important ones. Included in the list of fishing instruments was the konou. 
The fishery census collected information on fishing activities and a limited number of 
socio-economic variables through a one-time visit. The census questionnaire inquired after 
4 “Quelle est la principale confession religieuse de cette personne?”. 
5 “Quels engins de pêche avez-vous manipulés les 2 semaines passées?”. 
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religious adherence through a question about ‘religion’ (no full sentence was specified). The 
answer coding included a separate code for Voodoo or animism (Vodoun).6 
Information on the use of the konou was obtained in the census by asking the following 
question: “Which of these fishing instruments/techniques do you use?”7 One of the categories 
listed below this question was the konou.  
Information on the closing of the lake during the household survey period was obtained 
through semi-structured and open-ended interviews with members of the fishing committees.  
Table B.2 provides a summary of the variables used in our analysis and how information 
regarding these variables was collected in the survey and census.  
  
6 Another answer category was ‘other traditional religions’. This answer category was not recorded in the entire 
census dataset, indicating that there are no other important traditional or animistic religions besides Voodoo in this 
region. 
7 “Lesquelles de ces unités/systèmes de pêches pratiquez-vous?”. 
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Table B.2: Summary of variables measured and questions asked 
Panel A: Household survey   
Question/Definition Variable measured 
"What fishing instruments have you used in the past two weeks?" Konou 
"What is the main religious confession of this person?" Voodoo 
Lake Nokoué was closed to the use of the konou during this week Closed 
Age Age 
"During how many years was this person in school (present, even 
without passing)?" Years of education 
Average daily earnings*days worked in 2008 per activity, summed 
across activitiesa Annual income  
Total number of persons living in the household Household size 
Ratio of dependent and active household membersb  Dependency ratio  
"Provide the total value in FCFA obtained from the sales of shrimp 
catches." Fishing revenue for shrimp 
"How many days have you fished in each of the two past weeks?" Number of fishing days 
"Who has accompanied you while fishing during the past two 
weeks?"  Number of persons fishing 
"What fishing instruments have you used in the past two weeks?"  Other fishing gear 
Panel B: Fishery Census   
Question/Definition Variable measured  
"Which of these fishing instruments/techniques do you use?"  Konou 
Religion Voodoo 
Age Age 
Level of education (categories, not years) Education 
Number of dependent children Number of dependent children 
Ethnicity  Ethnicity 
Source: Author’s 2009 household survey implemented and 2006 fishery census implemented by the government of 
Benin (UCN/PMEDP/Direction des Pêches) for FAO. Notes:  
a: The corresponding questions in the survey are: "How many days per month did you engage in this activity in 
2008?" and "How much did you earn on average per working day from this activity (net, i.e. after deduction of 
costs)?" 
b: Dependent individuals are children (age<15) and elderly (age>60). Active members are individuals aged 
between 15 and 60. 
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C. The history of Voodoo and fisheries management in the south of Benin 
According to Pliya (1980), in pre-colonial times the traditional Voodoo governance institution 
managed to keep resource exploitation in check, even in the face of population growth. The 
system started to fail, however, when the colonization of Benin brought about profound socio-
economic changes (Dangbégnon, 2000; Pliya, 1980). The traditional politico-religious structures 
were undermined by new colonial and post-colonial powers, and these powers also introduced 
Christian religions that started to compete with Voodoo. As the power of Voodoo declined, the 
deterring effect of sanctions decreased. At the same time, the benefits of shirking increased with 
the rising value of fishery products following commercialization and market integration of the 
economy. The economic opportunities created by a growing fishing sector, combined with a 
booming population, brought about large flows of internal migration to the southern lakes. 
Newly settled agricultural communities started exploiting the lake resources as well, engaging in 
a competition with the communities who had been full-time fishers since pre-colonial times. 
These part-time fishers showed little respect for the traditional Voodoo system, fishing whenever 
and wherever they chose, openly disobeying rules and undermining the authority of Voodoo 
priests. The influx of outsiders thus further eroded the power of the Voodoo system and reduced 
the incentives to obey the rules (Pliya, 1980).  
The waning power of the traditional Voodoo institution led to an institutional vacuum, 
which the Beninese government attempted to fill by creating new governance institutions. Yet, 
these governmentally created institutions failed to effectively regulate fishing activities 
(Dangbégnon, 2000; Pliya, 1980). Rules were left unmonitored, sanctions were too lenient and 
punishments were rarely and inconsistently implemented. For instance, civil servants designated 
to inspect the use of fishing gear explained to us that in the run-up to elections, the incumbent 
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attempts to win the votes of fishers by halting monitoring and certainly sanctioning (see also 
Dangbégnon, 2000). Besides failing to effectively regulate the fishing activity, the central 
government undermined the authority of Voodoo priests and the traditional rules that they 
represented by creating new fishery management institutions and replacing traditional leaders 
with government administrations (Pliya, 1980).  For example, by enforcing the individual 
property claim of acadja owners 8, the government broke with the long-established Voodoo 
principle that preserved the lake and its resources as common property (Pliya, 1980). 
Under the Marxist-Leninist regime in Benin (1972-1989) the government took a hostile 
attitude towards Voodoo, actively targeting it with anti-religious campaigns and laws against 
sorcery (Tall, 1995b). With the democratic renewal in the 1990s the tide turned: authorities 
actively supported the Voodoo religion and promoted it as a symbol of national identity and 
cultural heritage. Important signals of the new attitude towards Voodoo were the organization of 
an annual national Voodoo festival and the enlistment of Voodoo in the constitution as an 
official religion. The Voodoo religion regained vitality and became more and more organized as 
a national traditional religion (Tall, 1995b). 
 
 
8 The acadja is a type of brush park fishery where branches are placed in the bottom of the lake and fenced with a 
fishing net. Owners guard their acadjas and allow no one else to harvest fish inside the fenced area. 
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